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The Social Agency of Things?  
Animism and Materiality in the Andes
and places. Through this discussion I seek to draw out 
issues that are central to the practice of Andean ani-
mism that are also of concern within current theories 
of agency and materiality. For instance, I will show 
how objects that have had a prior relationship with 
other places, things or people are thought to remain 
in communication even after their physical separation, 
some Andean people use this ‘inalienable’ character of 
things to construct offerings that draw places, things 
and people into reciprocal obligations. This provides 
a different perspective on Gell’s discussion of ‘second-
ary agency’ which has a very direct bearing on how 
we should interpret the selection and composition of 
‘ritual deposits’ in archaeology. 
The agency of people and things
Human agency is usually located in both the capac-
ity of people to develop ‘aims’ and the actions they 
undertake to try to achieve those aims (Dobres & 
Robb 2000). Human agency is the ability to both 
imagine and enact different actions while continu-
ally re-evaluating the efficacy of these actions within 
changing situations (Emirbayer & Mische 1998). A 
person’s agency requires self-awareness and volition, 
but it is socially embedded and constrained within 
wide-ranging economic and social structures. One of 
the primary outcomes of our individual agency is to 
reproduce these structures, often as the unintended 
outcome of our actions (Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 
A major focus of inter-disciplinary debate has been the need to bridge the Cartesian divide 
between people as active subjects and inert passive objects, to better reflect how things 
provoke and resist human actions through their ‘secondary agency’. Many Central Andean 
people express a deep concern about their relationship with places and things, which they 
communicate with through daily work and rituals involving ‘sympathetic magic’. A 
consideration of Andean animism emphasizes how agency is located in the social relationship 
people have with the material world and how material objects can have social identities.
The close bond that exists between people and 
things is well illustrated in our use of the motor car. 
As drivers we can treat the car as an extension of 
our bodies changing gear with minimal conscious 
effort, yet we can also treat it as a willful living 
entity, venting our anger at cars that ‘refuse’ to start 
(Gell 1998). Similarly we may shout at the computer 
that deletes our files, or fondle the keep-sake that 
reminds us of a departed friend. Are these actions 
provoked by our minds and the ideas we project onto 
things? Are they inherent within the materiality and 
actions of the object? Or, is agency a quality of the 
relationship between people and objects that cannot 
adequately be located in either of them separately? 
I consider the last of these options a more fruitful 
route for discussion and, because this ‘relational’ 
view is fundamental to the practices that Tylor (1923) 
categorized as animism, a consideration of animistic 
world-views may assist this discussion. 
I start this article with a review of work on 
agency and materiality which outlines my own view 
of human and material agency. In the next section I 
review animism in the Central Andes in relation to 
historical and archaeological work relating to the 
Inca state and recent ethnographic research by myself 
and others. The aim is to show how Andean people 
construct social relationships with the material world, 
how this relational view gives identity to things, and 
how offerings and daily work are used to develop 
reciprocal social obligations with these animate objects 
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1984). Human agency is not the ability to achieve 
specified aims, a definition that may better describe 
a computer or machine, it is rather the motivation 
and individual creativity incorporated in the human 
body through which we gain the physical ability to 
act and engage in social relations. Gardner usefully 
defines agency as an active human involvement in 
the world
both as a capacity or quality of being human and as a 
process or relationship of engagement with a social and 
material world. This means that there is no agency 
without individual humans, who have a distinctively 
active, embodied consciousness, but that equally 
there can be no autonomous agent, as this active 
consciousness can only really develop through inter-
action (fundamentally binding agency to structure) 
(Gardner 2007, 103 — emphasis in original). 
If we are to identify what makes human agency 
different to that of other animals, we need to con-
sider how human self-conscious cognitive abilities 
developed. Many of the cognitive abilities that we 
consider central to our self-consciousness could only 
have developed through our ancestor’s engagement 
with material culture (Mithen 2001; Renfrew 2004). 
Mead (1934; 1938) argued that our self-conscious-
ness emerges out of the dynamic process of our 
interaction with physical objects including our own 
and other people’s physical bodies. A fundamental 
corollary of this ‘self-perception’ is the capacity to 
conceptualize the perspective of another person. 
This is what Mead calls our capacity for sociality, the 
ability to ‘take the attitude of the other’ (Mead 1932, 
87). Mead uses the term sociality in a broad sense 
to describe the process through which two or more 
entities went through a ‘contact experience’ which 
influenced the physical entities involved (such as the 
relationship between planets). But here I am refer-
ring to Mead’s (1932) concept of the more developed 
sense of sociality which allows humans to remember 
past actions and anticipate future responses, and to 
imagine how different participants may interpret and 
respond to the situation. Sociality provides us with 
the ability to empathize with other human beings 
by using our imagination to ‘take the attitude’ of 
another individual or the ‘generalized other’ of a 
social group (Mead 1932, 87). But it can also involve 
the attribution of human-like personalities and 
desires to animals, plants, places and things. Mead 
suggested that ‘primitive man keeps en rapport with 
implements and weapons by conversations in the 
form of magic rites and ceremonies’ (Mead 1932, 169), 
and considered the delimitation of objects as purely 
physical or mechanical things lacking in social or 
living characteristics to be a further stage of mental 
development. Yet what characterizes animistic beliefs 
is precisely an empathetic concern for places and 
things which are considered to have social identities 
(although not always ‘human-like’). 
Most researchers make a clear distinction 
between the agency of people and materials as physi-
cal resources; however the degree to which people 
(such as slaves and factory workers) or things (such 
as mountains and paintings) are attributed social 
identities, and considered to have the power to act 
depends on cultural perceptions, and this affects 
what constitutes ‘social relations’. Things engage our 
emotions and evoke memories, ideas and meanings 
in our minds giving them a ‘social life’ (Merleau-
Ponty 2002; Appadurai 1986; Jones 2007), and the 
‘inalienable’ character of some things allows them to 
carry some of the identity of the maker or previous 
owners (Weiner 1992). Robb (2004) has discussed the 
idea of the ‘extended artefact’, highlighting the com-
plex web of interdependent relationships that many 
things embed us in, providing much of the structure 
of society and the tools for human agency. All of this 
gives artefacts ‘secondary agency’ (Gell 1998), even 
if an artwork lacks volition or intentionality it can 
have an effect on other people that is independent of 
the original maker’s intentions. While most of these 
authors discuss how things have some power or 
capacity to elicit human emotions and influence our 
actions, a few introduce the possibility that things 
actually have a degree of intentionality of their own. 
Latour’s (1993) symmetrical anthropology has chal-
lenged our prioritizing of human agency by exploring 
causal agency from the viewpoint of material objects 
as well as human ‘subjects’. Gell (1998) and Gosden 
(2005) both explore the possibility that artefacts with 
particular forms and designs use people as a medium 
for their own reproduction. Gardner (2007, 103) points 
out that these stronger claims for the active agency of 
things could have the dangerous effect of undermin-
ing individual human responsibilities and rights (e.g. 
blaming the Columbine student massacre on guns 
or video games: Strauss 2007). The material world is 
not passive, as it both provokes and resists human 
actions, however I agree with Robb (2004) that the 
degree to which things have a ‘secondary’ or ‘effective’ 
agency originates in how people perceive and engage 
with things through their conscious agency. Below, 
I will discuss how Andean concepts of animism are 
a potential challenge to this view as they consider 
places and things to be sentient entities that have the 
power to act.
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Animism 
A social relationship with the material world
Tylor (1913) defined animism as the belief that an 
entity has a soul or animating spirit. Many people 
consider some or all ancestors, animals, plants, places 
and things to have a vital force, spirit or identity 
that directly affects the human world, and that these 
non-human ‘persons’ deserve respectful relationships 
from humans (Harvey 2005). Tylor’s work can be 
criticized for the underlying assumptions of progres-
sive social evolution, and one of the fall-outs from this 
has been the frequent stress on examples of animism 
as a ‘primitive’ aspect of hunter-gatherer societies. 
However, animism is a wide-spread ontology that is 
maintained within a wide range of social structures, 
economies, beliefs and world-views. The idea that a 
‘spirit’ was needed to account for ‘primitive’ beliefs 
in animate objects was in part due to the projection 
of Tylor’s Christian concepts. Marett (1914) criticized 
Tylor for assuming that the attribution of life-like 
properties to things requires a belief in souls, and 
he adopted the Melanesian word mana to describe 
this vitalizing force. Recent discussions of animism 
have continued to critique the focus on the ‘spirit’ or 
‘soul’ as somehow beyond nature or the experienced 
aspects of the physical world (Ingold 2006). A large 
part of what Tylor was describing as animism is a very 
direct and personal engagement with the materiality 
of the natural and cultural world, what is distinct is 
the assumption that some or all aspects of the material 
world are sentient and can be communicated with in 
a direct and social way. This led Bird-David (1999) to 
adopt the term ‘relational epistemology’ to describe 
the core values of animism as a belief in the ability of 
people, places and things to communicate with each 
other rather than Tylor’s focus on the super-natural 
world of spirits (Ingold 2006; Hornborg 2006). 
Today, in the Central Andean highlands of Peru 
and Bolivia, the focus of animism is most clearly 
expressed in relation to prominent mountains (Apus), 
agricultural fields (Pachamama), the house, the recently 
dead and miraculous saints (Bastien 1978; Allen 1988; 
Gose 1994). These entities have a power, or sphere of 
influence, that extends beyond their physical location: 
the ancestors and pachamama influence the growth of 
crops, the mountains have a wide ranging influence, 
including control over camelid herds and mining 
activities, and the saints teach people craft skills, pro-
vide security during travel and promote good health 
(Allen 1988; Gose 1994; Sallnow 1987). The mountains 
and saints can offer benevolent productivity to those 
who engage in appropriate reciprocity, or become 
malevolent and potentially violent to those who 
are careless, exploitative or immoral. Many Andean 
people today commit time, thought and materials 
to making various offerings in order to supplicate 
these entities. Almost all ritual activity is focused on 
justifying interventions such as ploughing, mining 
and travelling as well as requesting well-being and 
productivity. This is achieved through developing 
a personal relationship with specific animate places 
through repeated offerings, annual pilgrimage, and 
frequent evocation. The ‘success’ of sacrifice is not 
measured in any visible response or change but is con-
sidered an essential part of the continuity of daily life. 
In fact it is a mistake to separate such ritual offering 
from other activities such as agricultural work, animal 
husbandry, music and dance are also considered to 
be acts of communication and exchange with the 
animate forces of pachamama and the apus (Gose 1986; 
Laurencich-Minelli 1991; Stobart 2006). 
Highland Andean people do not use terms such as 
‘god’ or ‘super-natural’ to describe the animate world 
which is usually considered to be immediate and tan-
gible. Although ethnographers have used terms such as 
‘mountain deities’, the sentient mountains are usually 
equated with powerful people (such as Pre-Columbian 
ethnic leaders — apus) that ‘commoners’ try to suppli-
cate and occasionally remonstrate against.
The Andean people do not separate the natural from 
the spiritual environment. They believe that, like ani-
mals and people, all elements of nature live, feel, and 
breathe. Pachamama, the Apus, lakes, rocks, springs, 
and animate and inanimate beings — all aspects of 
nature need food and drink, love and consideration 
(Bolin 1998, 43). 
While I have only been told that people have a soul 
‘alma’, both people and other entities (e.g. alpacas, 
maize, illas) can have ‘ánimo’, the vitalizing energy that 
animates life (cf. Allen 1982; 1988, 60–62; Gose 1994, 
115–16; Stobart 2006, 27–8) It is interesting to note that 
when the people of Huaquirca, Apurimac, Peru, report 
to Peter Gose seeing the almas separated from the 
ánimo of dying people they could be recognized by
their inability to perceive or interact with the living. 
Deafness to the greetings of the living is the most 
common way these almas are detected as such. Since 
the ánimo is supposed to maintain the senses, it is 
logical that these almas wandering in a state of sepa-
ration would be oblivious to the presence of others 
(Gose 1994, 116; cf. Stobart 2006, 28; Allen n.d.). 
It is the ánimo, the vitalizing animation which people, 
animals and some things possess, which provides the 
activity and senses vital to perception and communi-
cation, not the human soul. 
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In his long, illustrated letter to the king of Spain, 
the native author Guaman Poma (1988) depicts the 
Inka period huacas (cult objects and locations that 
were the focus of veneration) with eyes and mouths. 
Although wooden and stone carvings were made 
and worshipped before the Spanish conquest this 
form of anthropomorphizing is not a feature of cur-
rent Andean animism. It seems likely that in order 
to communicate the idea of the animate world to the 
Spanish, Guaman Poma felt the need for some illustra-
tive convention to depict the animate entities, whereas 
native Andeans did not require the addition of facial 
features to perceive the material world as living. The 
material world can be conceived of as sentient without 
the need to impute purely human-like qualities or 
‘spirit’ to it. For instance, the huaca of Huanacaure, 
one of the most important huacas of the Inca state, was 
overlooked by the Spanish when sacking its cult site, 
because they only saw a ‘rough stone’ (Cobo 1990, 
74). Yet this ‘rough stone’ was considered to be the 
petrified body of Ayar Cache, a founding ancestor of 
the Inka lineage. The fact that material objects and 
places could be drawn into human kinship shows how 
the boundary between human, place and thing were 
much less clear in the Andes of the fifteenth century 
than Cartesian views would allow (Bray, this issue). 
Although the animate power of the material world is 
also a feature of modern Andean beliefs there have 
been significant changes since 1532.
Gose (2006) has drawn attention to the fact that 
the earliest Spanish records suggest that many huacas 
were specific objects, but mountains and large-scale 
landscape features became a more dominant focus 
of Andean animism after the Spanish extirpation 
of idolatries. While Inka rituals frequently focused 
around specific objects, such as the Huanacaure stone 
huaca, they also focused on wider landscape, as can 
be seen in the high mountain Capacocha sacrifices (see 
below). Since the Spanish priests put great effort into 
finding and destroying the material focus of any native 
Andean rituals such as huacas and mummy bundles, 
broad, indestructible, landscape features have gained 
ever greater strength. While in the colonial period, 
saints’ effigies joined the hierarchy of Andean animate 
beings, and more recently trucks and computers 
have joined houses and animal herds as a focus for 
protective rituals. Thus, the focus of animism is not 
fixed, but is continually developing within the social 
history of the area.
Mutual consumption — feed the world
Today Andean animism is most clearly expressed 
within a series of practices through which people 
make offerings that seek to reciprocate the benevo-
lence of the animate world, or stave off malevolence. 
A central purpose of these rituals is to engender and 
promote a commitment on the part of the mountains, 
ancestors and other animate forces to the people 
making the offerings. This relational view of animate 
non-human entities is embedded within a moral con-
ception of society (cf. Descola 1994). Andean concerns 
about appropriate reciprocity are described both in 
relation to people and in terms of ritual obligations to 
the saints and apus (Isbell 1985). As with all gifts, the 
aim of ritual offerings is to create a tie of obligation 
between the animate entity and the devotee making 
the offering (Mauss 1990; Sillar 2004), these gifts are 
a material expression of an on-going commitment 
to care for the house, the fields and the animals that 
is also expressed in less overtly ritual acts such as 
ploughing, irrigating and planting crops.
A major expression of the social relationship 
between people and things is the fact that people are 
responsible for feeding the mountain (apus), mother 
earth (pachamama), miraculous saints and other enti-
ties. This is a form of ‘mutual consumption’ as it is 
only if people give nourishment to the animate world 
that they can expect to be fed in return (Isbell 1985; 
Weismantel 1988; Gose 1994; Sillar 2000). This feed-
ing takes place through feasts and offerings that bind 
the household and/or the community to each other 
and to the focus of their sacrificial acts (Isbell 1985; 
Abercrombie 1998; Gose 1986; Allen 1988).
In the Andean highlands today such offerings 
may be ‘sent’ through four major routes (cf. Allen 
1982, 191):
1. Food offerings can be sent through the body of a 
participant who consumes food and drink for the 
stated recipient (e.g. a living person or ancestor).
2. A small amount of drink can be poured or the 
essential essence (sami) of coca leaves can be blown 
towards a named recipient such as a house, moun-
tain apu or saint.
3. A prepared offering can be burnt in a fire (referred 
to as a dispachu from the Spanish term for a mes-
sage).
4. An offering can be buried or placed at a specific 
location (e.g. when constructing a house). 
Each of these methods combines the preparation of 
particular goods and directing their life-giving force 
through the location, orientation and composition of 
the offering as well as a verbal evocation of the recipi-
ent. Similar techniques are also reported for the Inka 
(Cobo 1990, 115–17).
Drinks such as maize beer and alcohol provide 
a major route for communication with the dead, but 
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may also be directed at other entities 
such as the mountain apus and saints 
(Abercrombie 1998). Prior to drink-
ing, a small libation (ch’alla) is poured 
on the ground or a little of the chicha 
is flicked into the air (t’inka) with 
pachamama an apu, saint, ancestor or 
animate entity being stipulated as the 
recipient of the essence of the drink 
(sami) (Allen 1988) (Fig. 1). Although 
most modern domestic pottery in 
the Andes is not highly decorated, 
the most complex pottery forms and 
elaborate decoration are applied 
to vessels used in the preparation 
and particularly the consumption 
of chicha (Sillar 2000). This prefer-
ence for decorating drinking cups 
is partly because chicha-drinking is 
a communal activity, but it is also 
because chicha is used as a form of 
communication with the ancestors 
and animate world. The form and 
decoration of the drinking vessels 
express ideological concepts such 
as animal fecundity and balanced 
complementarity (Stobart 1996) and these symbolic 
messages are directed not just at other people but at 
the animate world to whom the chicha offerings are 
made (cf. Sterner 1989) (Fig. 2). 
Sympathetic magic: the inalienable connectedness of things
In Raqchi, Department of Cuzco, Peru, an offering is 
made by most households on the night of San Luis 
(24 August) when family members chew coca, and 
make libations over a ritual cloth. Next to this cloth 
are placed the illas, carved figures or natural pebbles 
that evoke animals, houses, or crop plants (Fig. 3). 
These illas are living beings said to be found on the 
hillside that come as gifts (indeed as the children) of 
the mountain deities (apus) (Flores-Ochoa 1979; Isbell 
Figure 1. Itinerant potter from Ticatica, Potosi, Bolivia with 34 sacks of 
maize acquired in exchange for the pottery he made. Before his return home he 
is making a burnt offering (smoking to the left) and libations of chicha (from 
the gourd in the potter’s hand) for the maize and his safe journey.
Figure 2. (on right) Drinking chicha and making 
libations (ch’alla) during Todos Santos, Pumpuri, Potosi, 
Bolivia. The turuwasus the men are drinking out of are 
wooden bowls with carved plough teams in the middle, at 
other times of the year each individual drinker holds both 
of the paired vessels for ritual drinking, but during Todos 
Santos, when participants are drinking with the dead, 
the turuwasus are used singly. At their feet is a wich’i 
being used to serve chicha, and two pottery llamas 
(samiri) also used for ritual drinking and libations.
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1985). Illas are a source of life and productivity, dur-
ing rituals they are said to be drinking the chicha and 
chewing the coca given in the offerings (Allen 1988, 
54, 150). Miniatures are frequently used in Andean 
rituals either as offerings or, as in this case, to act 
as a channel to transfer offerings from people to the 
apus (Sillar 1996). I have observed about ten of these 
offerings being prepared in Raqchi between 1987 
and 2005 and there is quite considerable variation 
in each family’s practices. But, all offering consist of 
carefully preparing groups of three good coca leaves 
(k’intu) and blowing the essence (sami) to a variety of 
entities. The naming of offering recipients starts with 
the house, hearth and stores, and the family members 
themselves both living and dead. Each field worked by 
the family and each bit of pasture land or path used 
by their animals is named, and the clay mines, roads 
and market places that the household members com-
monly visit. After this each k’intu of three coca leaves 
is placed onto the cloth or paper alongside a maize 
kernel. The maize kernels are significant as they come 
from one of the household’s best maize cobs, stressing 
continuity of the seed crop which is grown in the fields 
of the householder’s parents. Once they are prepared 
one bundle of coca leaves is taken into the household 
patio to be burnt and the other is taken to one of the 
household’s fields to be consumed in a fire (Fig. 4). 
At both locations it is important to move back to the 
house and chew coca as soon as the fire has taken hold 
of the offering. Only later do people return to observe 
the ash and see if the complete burning of the offering 
shows it has been fully accepted. The household’s illas 
are then stored away carefully until the next offering 
needs to be prepared.
In this ritual many of the features of Andean 
animism can be identified including how the blowing 
of coca essence (sami) and the consumption by fire 
(dispachu) serve to send the offering to the correct 
recipient. There are clear differences between the 
recipient of the offering (e.g. apu), the constituents of 
the offering (e.g. coca), material intermediaries used 
to help transmit the offering (e.g. illa), and the target 
of concern (e.g. fields, animals and households). Even 
though all of these possess animating energy (e.g. 
sami or ánimo) they occupy different positions in the 
social hierarchy of animate entities. The mountains 
and miraculous saints are somewhat distant bodies 
that are thought to be observant guardians concerned 
about the well-being of fields, crops, animal flocks, 
craft production and human health (Allen 1988; 
Sallnow 1987). While lower-order intermediaries 
such as illas, village crosses, and specific offering 
locations are in the care of households and serve to 
support communication and direct offerings to the 
great animate powers. 
In order to understand these rituals we need to 
reconsider Frazer’s (1915) concept of ‘sympathetic 
magic’, as this has a direct bearing on how the compo-
sition of the offering brings together a wide range of 
important locations through evocation and materials. 
Frazer (1915) identified ‘homeopathic magic’ where 
Figure 3. Raqchi, Dept. Cuzco, Peru. At the start of 
preparing the second k’intuqwi offering, which gives 
thanks for, and requests the, health and fertility of the 
household’s animals. The carved stone illa of a plough 
team is marked using the same hematite-rich clay used to 
mark sheep and llamas and to paint pottery. The bowl of 
coca leaves chewed during the preparation of the offerings, 
the content of the small bottles of alcohol and wine, and 
the little jug of chicha will all be included in the burnt 
offering (dispachu). At the centre of the photograph, 
behind the father’s hands a small bowl (referred to as a 
cocha or lake, evoking the place from which the animals 
are thought to have originated) is filled with wine which 
the small illa of a sheep within it drinks from. 
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like produces like, or an effect resembles its cause 
(which he called the law of similarity), and ‘conta-
gious magic’ where things which have once been in 
contact with each other continue to act on each other 
at a distance even though the physical contact has 
been severed (which he called the law of Contact or 
Contagion). Frazer placed both of these under the 
umbrella term of ‘sympathetic magic’, as they both 
assume that things act on each other at a distance 
through a ‘secret sympathy’. Although Frazer’s Victo-
rian attitude to evolutionary progression from magic, 
through religion to science has been widely criticized, 
his analysis correctly identified widespread practices 
that utilized the principles of similarity and contagion 
and his examples also showed great variability in the 
specifics of their application. 
These are important concepts in how people 
conceive materials to have a social relationship and 
influence that is quite distinct from their physical 
properties. A critical reconsideration of materiality 
in past societies requires a re-evaluation of Frazer’s 
important concepts. This could be described as the 
‘inalienable character of things’. Whereas Weiner 
(1992) focused on how objects remain connected to 
previous human owners, even if physically separated, 
Frazer’s concepts of similarity and contagion stress 
how objects are connected to other objects, places, 
or animate entities through their raw materials and 
form. The assumption that you can influence one 
thing based on its prior relationship to another person, 
place, thing or process is a primary principle of present 
day Andean ritual practice. The composition of many 
ritual offerings, including the ones prepared in Raqchi, 
requires the components to be brought together from 
a wide range of environments and contexts to influ-
ence the animate forces of the material world through 
their evocative form and the continuing communion 
with their prior source (Bolin 1998, 40–41; cf. Zedeño 
2008). Thus, places and things are considered to have a 
similar social relatedness to those surrounding human 
kinship. Just as people remain connected and obliged 
to their biological family and to those whom they 
acknowledge through marriage, adoption or fictive 
kin relationships, so too the ‘inalienable character of 
things’ means objects continue to exert an influence 
on their origin or referent.
In the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries Inka 
state ritual specialists prepared elaborate offerings 
that involved the sacrifice of carefully selected objects 
and sometimes animals and children. For instance 
capacocha offerings were prepared in Cuzco and sent 
to many different locations. These could include 
mullu (Spondulus shells from the Ecuadorian coast), 
coca leaves from the lowlands, cumbi (fine textiles), 
miniature gold, silver and shell statuettes of people 
and camelids, featherwork from Amazonia, highland 
camelids, a range of pottery vessels manufactured in 
diverse locations, keros (wooden drinking cups) and 
youthful boys and girls aged between about 5 and 15 
(Cobo 1990, 154; Reinhard 1992; 1996; Bray et al. 2005; 
Wilson et al. 2007). Like the present-day domestic 
offering in Raqchi, these Inka state offerings develop 
relationships between disparate places through the 
materiality of the offering’s many components (and 
no doubt the prayers and evocations: Bray et al. 2005, 
86–7, 95–8). 
Figure 4. Raqchi, Dept. Cuzco, Peru. At the corner of a 
field, next to an Inca carved stone, where this household 
always burns their offering. The father has prepared a 
small animal dung fire onto which he places the offering 
of coca leave k’intus, maize kernels, animal fat and herbs, 
he then added the alcohol and sprinkled some chicha from 
the cups by his feet before we returned to his house while 
the fire consumed the offering for the apu. 
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Although the elaborate ceremonies of the Inka in 
Cuzco were reported to the chroniclers, it is important 
to consider that the mountain-top sacrifice could 
not have been witnessed by many. Like the dispachu 
in Raqchi, it was the huaca or the apu that were the 
intended observer/consumer. Rather than seeing these 
offerings as the Inka state ‘physically claiming sacred 
sites and spaces’ (Bray, this issue), I believe that Inka 
offerings are better understood as an act of commu-
nication with the sentient power of these places. Like 
the maize kernels, coca leaves, and illas used in Raqchi, 
the children, food vessels and metal figurines used 
in the Inka capacochas each had complex biographies 
that made ‘inalienable connections’ to their places of 
origin or manufacture and symbolic referents through 
their form and decoration. The act of sacrifice was 
intended to make these source locations and referents 
into links of reciprocity with the animate mountain, 
these were no doubt further directed through the 
prayers and rituals that went into preparing the offer-
ing. The composition of these offerings aimed to bind 
the animate mountain or huaca recipients into social 
obligations that requested the power and fecundity of 
the mountain to contribute to the many parts of the 
Empire that contributed to the offering, particularly 
the ritual centre of Cuzco where the offering was first 
prepared. 
Relating Andean animism to agency theory
Our social relationship with the material world
Animism locates people as participants in the material 
world and demands that they take responsibility for 
their relationship with animals, plants, places, things 
and people (Ingold 2000; Bird-David 1999; Hornborg 
2006). Animism does not make people fatalistic or 
disengaged: in fact one of the strongest components 
of Andean animism is a concern over moral behaviour 
and social responsibility to other people, as well as the 
animate world. Although there are spirits and danger-
ous non-corporeal beings in the Andean world-view, 
the essence of Andean animism is not in the ‘spirits’, it 
is in the social identities of material places and things 
which are considered to be sentient: ‘for Andeans, 
all matter is in some sense alive, and conversely, all 
life has a material base’ (Allen 1988, 62). Both Tylor’s 
(1913) focus on the belief that animistic entities have a 
soul or a spirit, and the ethnographic focus on the ritu-
als and offerings where animistic concerns are most 
clearly expressed and enacted, has had the unfortu-
nate effect of over-exoticizing animism. Animism is an 
ontology which has at its core the simple philosophy 
that people have an inter-dependent social relation-
ship with the material world. For many people in the 
Central Andean highlands today, rituals that focus on 
the apus and the saints are a more explicit expression of 
a continuous daily commitment to care for the fields, 
the animals and the household. The assumption that 
the material world is sentient and can be incorporated 
into social relationships is central to this commitment 
(Allen 1982; 1988; Gose 1994.).
If ‘agency is located not simply within bounded 
human bodies but within the wider set of social rela-
tionships that make up the person’ (Brück 2001, 655), 
then in the Andes such wider social relations would 
extend to include social interaction with the material 
world. Andean rituals are based on the concept that 
things that have had a prior relationship, or evoke 
similarities, with other places, things or people may 
continue to have an effective relationship with their 
origin or referent. In fact the human kinship and the 
animistic relatedness of ‘sympathetic magic’ are com-
bined when stone huacas are considered to be human 
ancestors. This is expressed in the idea of mutual 
consumption where the people and the animate places 
and things of the Andes feed and nurture each other. 
This could be considered in relation to Robb’s (2004) 
‘extended artefacts’ and Gell’s (1998) ‘distributed 
persons’ where the identity of people and meaning 
of things are co-constructed, and yet each person, 
each object and each place have distinct histories with 
particular networks of relationships.
Animism as an essential aspect of human engagement 
with the material world?
Almost all theoretical discussions of material agency 
focus on human-made-artefacts and technology, but 
Andean animism primarily focuses on places and 
natural features, although some artefacts such as illas, 
carved huacas and buildings are also powerful entities. 
This focus on the power of the natural environment 
partly reflects rural Andean communities’ funda-
mental concern with agriculture and animal herding. 
Although many Andean people see everything as 
potentially having animate qualities, they are selective 
in which features they choose to engage with in active 
rituals. Everyone invests some things and places with 
more emotional engagement than others and these 
items, or locations, tend to be strong reference points 
for our personal and cultural identity (e.g. cars, homes, 
flags or Kula necklaces). It is the personal relationship 
and communal commitment that we invest in specific 
items that gives them their agency. The idea that some 
places and things have greater agency than others is 
similar to the variability of human agency (where a 
president’s agency is greater than a slave’s), the social 
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agency of things, just like that of people, depends on 
their context and the network of relationships that 
they are involved in.
Hornborg (2006) argues that in practice we 
all have animistic tendencies. While we may take a 
modernist detachment in relation to construction or 
engineering, we are content to adopt a more relational 
and morally driven attitude to our homes and personal 
life. ‘We probably all have reassured spaces in our 
lives where we are practising animists, in the sense 
that engagement and “relatedness” take precedence 
over detached observation’ (Hornborg 2006, 23). 
Unlike the rigours of written logic, in practice we can 
accommodate diverse perceptions and explanations, 
and choose to highlight different aspects at different 
times. Many of us combine an acceptance of objec-
tive scientific explanations, religious convictions, the 
rituals of Father Christmas and belief in the ‘power 
of love’, without needing to fully reconcile them. 
Similarly the people of the Andean highlands farm, 
herd and mine, they discuss pollution and global 
warming, go to Catholic churches and communicate 
with landscape features and ancestors. Andean 
construction workers provide detailed technological 
and material explanations for their building work as 
well as preparing offerings for the strength and well-
being of their buildings. In practice we neither have a 
purely animistic belief in the social agency of things 
nor a purely objective understanding of our physical 
exploitation of material properties. Part of the creativ-
ity of our social engagement in the world is precisely 
the ability to move between, or combine, our technical 
manipulation of materials and our social relationship 
with them as emotive things. This facilitates our ability 
to creatively combine diverse components to make 
material culture that is both functional and meaning-
ful, and it also gives many objects a powerful second-
ary agency to move beyond any physical function and 
engage our attention at an emotional level.
Humans differentiated themselves from other 
animals partly through developing their wider social-
ity (Mead 1932). This was accomplished through their 
(our) social engagement with the material world, 
including the relational view of the ‘inalienable char-
acter of things’, which permits places and things to 
carry identities and meanings. It is likely that some 
of the earliest ways in which artefacts and materials 
were used to communicate meaning was in their use 
to direct messages at non-human entities. This is 
expressed in the common interpretation that Upper 
Palaeolithic rock art was created as a form of sympa-
thetic magic during hunting rituals (Lewis-Williams 
& Clottes 1998). I suspect that the ability to give things 
social meaning, and the idea of symbolic storage 
(Donald 1991; Renfrew 2004), would not have been 
possible without the ambiguous sociality that allows 
people to have social relationships with things while 
at the same time objectivizing them as manipulable 
material resources. 
Human agency in the Andes
As discussed above, Andean animism considers the 
material world to be sentient and critically respon-
sive to human actions. What I am less clear about 
is if, or how, the distinction between the agency of 
people and the agency of things would, or could, be 
articulated by Andean people. Perhaps this is partly 
expressed in the alma/ánimo distinction. While many 
entities have the vitalizing social energy of ánimo, 
only people possess a soul (alma). While the concept 
of the human soul may have been introduced into the 
Andes as a part of the conversion to Christianity, this 
distinction does seem to express a fairly fundamental 
characterization of what it is to be human. Unlike 
ánimo, the alma continues to exist as it journeys after 
death, revisiting their former communities and fields 
at the start of each rainy season and eventually the 
almas join a community of the dead who undertake 
essential complementary agricultural work to that of 
the living (Allen 1982; Harris 1982). While the animate 
powers of the mountains, fields and saints are largely 
described as guardians who watch and react to what 
people do, it is people who strive to work on the 
land and make offerings. Indeed the core duty of a 
responsible person in the Andes is to care for animals, 
fields, and family through their labour and social 
exchange. In the first section of this article I expressed 
my opinion that human agency is the creative ability 
to imagine aims and enact these through the human 
body and its sociality. But, if Andean people were to 
talk of ‘human agency’, I think they would stress how 
it is located in the reciprocity between people, places 
and things and the hard physical work that people 
undertake to maintain these relationships. If human 
agency is considered to be distinct from that of other 
forces in the Andean world it is because of the energy 
people bring to working cooperatively with animals, 
fields and mines, and the social relationships that they 
develop not just with other people but also with the 
material world.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Tamara Bray and Ben Alberti for 
inviting me to participate in a stimulating WAC session. 
Andrew Gardner, Sarah Byrne, Cesar Astuhuaman, and stu-
378
Special Section — Animating Archaeology
dents in the UCL Masters in Artefact Studies seminar were 
influential in discussing some of these ideas with me. Diura 
Thoden van Velsen, Tamara Bray, Andrew Gardner and Ben 
Alberti helpfully critiqued and edited previous versions of 
this article which allowed me to develop and clarify some 
points. Henry Stobart and Catherine Allen kindly shared 
with me some of their understanding of Andean animism 
and possible distinctions between alma and ánimo. I would 
particularly like to thank the patient people of Raqchi and 
Pumpuri who generously included me in their activities 
and tried to educate me into a better understanding of the 
world. Any errors in this article remain my responsibility, 
and reflect the fact that my education is ongoing. 
Bill Sillar
Insitute of Archaeology
University College London
31–34 Gordon Square
London
WC1H OPY
UK
Email: b.sillar@ucl.ac.uk
References
Abercrombie, T.A., 1998. Pathways of Memory and Power: Eth-
nography and History among an Andean People. Madison 
(WI): University of Wisconsin Press.
Allen, C.J., 1988. The Hold Life Has: Coca and Cultural Identity 
in an Andean Community. Washington (DC): Smithso-
nian Institution Press.
Allen, C.J., 1982. Body and soul in Quechua thought. Journal 
of Latin American Lore 8(2), 179–96. 
Allen, C.J., n.d. The Sadness of Jars: Separation and Rectifi-
cation in Andean Understandings of Death. Unpub-
lished manuscript.
Appadurai, A., 1986. The Social Life of Things: Commodities in 
Cultural Perpective. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Bastien, J.W., 1978. Mountain of the Condor: Metaphor and Rit-
ual in an Andean Ayllu. (American Ethnological Society 
Monograph 64.) St Paul (MN): West Publishing. 
Bird-David, N., 1999. Animism revisited: personhood, 
environment, and relational epistemology. Current 
Anthropology 40, 67–91.
Bolin, I., 1998. Rituals of Respect: the Secret of Survival in the 
High Peruvian Andes. Austin (TX): University of Texas 
Press.
Bourdieu, P., 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Bray, T.L., L.D. Minc, M.C. Ceruti, J.A. Chávez, R. Perea & 
J. Reinhard, 2005. A compositional analysis of pottery 
vessels associated with the Inca ritual of capacocha. 
Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 24, 82–100.
Brück, J., 2001. Monuments, power and personhood in the 
British Neolithic. Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute 7, 649–67. 
Cobo, B., 1990. Inca Religion and Customs (1653), translated by 
R. Hamilton. Austin (TX): University of Texas Press.
Descola, P., 1994. In the Society of Nature: a Native Ecology in 
Amazonia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dobres, M.-A. & J.E. Robb (eds.), 2000. Agency in Archaeology. 
London: Routledge.
Donald, M., 1991. The Origins of the Modern Mind. Cambridge 
(MA): Harvard University Press.
Emirbayer, M. & A. Mische, 1998. What is agency? American 
Journal of Sociology 103(4), 962–1023.
Flores-Ochoa, J.A., 1979. Pastoralists of the Andes, translated 
by R. Bolton. Philadelphia (PA): Institute for the Study 
of Human Issues.
Frazer, J.G., 1915. The Golden Bough: a Study in Magic and 
Religion. 3rd edition. London: Macmillan.
Gardner, A., 2007. Agency, in Handbook of Archaeological 
Theories, eds. R.A. Bentley, H.D.G. Maschner & C. 
Chippindale. Lanham (MD): Altamira, 95–108.
Gell, A., 1998. Art and Agency: an Anthropological Theory. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Giddens, A., 1984. The Constitution of Society. Cambridge: 
Polity Press.
Gosden, C., 2005. What do objects want? Journal of Archaeo-
logical Method and Theory 12(3), 193–211.
Gose, P., 1986. Sacrifice and the commodity form in the 
Andes. Man 21, 296–310.
Gose, P., 1994. Deathly Waters and Hungry Mountains: Agrar-
ian Ritual and Class Formation in an Andean Town. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Gose, P., 2006. Mountains historicized: ancestors and land-
scape in the colonial Andes, in Kay Pacha: Cultivating 
Earth and Water in the Andes, ed. P. Dransart. (British 
Archaeological Reports 1478.) Oxford: BAR.
Guamán Poma de Ayala, F., 1988. El Primer Nueva Crónica 
y Buen Gobierno (1584–1615). México: Siglo Veintiuno 
Editores.
Harvey, G., 2005. Animism: Respecting the Living World. New 
York (NY): Columbia University Press. 
Harris, O., 1982. The dead and the devils among the Bolivian 
Laymi, in Death and the Regeneration of Life, eds. M. 
Bloch & J. Parry. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 45–73.
Hornborg, A., 2006. Animism, fetishism, and objectivism as 
strategies for knowing (or not knowing) the world. 
Ethnos 71(1), 21–32.
Ingold, T., 2000. The Perception of the Environment: Essays in 
Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill. London: Routledge.
Ingold, T., 2006. Rethinking the animate, re-animating 
thought. Ethnos 71(1), 9–20.
Isbell, B.J., 1985. To Defend Ourselves: Ecology and Ritual in 
an Andean Village. Prospect Heights (IL): Waveland 
Press.
Jones, A., 2007. Memory and Material Culture. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Latour, B., 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge 
(MA): Harvard University Press.
Laurencich-Minelli, L., 1991. El trabajo como forma de 
culto estatal en el Imperio Inca, in El Culto Estatal del 
Imperio Inca, ed. M.S. Ziólkowski. (Memorias del 46° 
Congreso Internacional de Americanistas Symposio 
379
Sillar — The Social Agency of Things?
ARC-2 Amsterdam 1988.) Place??: Centro de Estudios 
Latinoameicanos, Universidad de Varsovia, 55–8.
Lewis-Williams, D.J. & J. Clottes, 1998. The Shamans of Pre-
history: Trance Magic and the Painted Caves. New York 
(NY): Abrams.
Marett, R., 1914. The Threshold of Religion. London: 
Methuen.
Mauss M., 1990. The Gift: the Form and Reason for Exchange 
in Archaic Societies, translated by W.D. Hall. London: 
Routledge.
Mead, G.H., 1932. The Philosophy of the Present. Chicago (IL): 
Open Court Publishing.
Mead, G.H., 1934. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago (IL): Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Mead, G.H., 1938. The Philosophy of the Act. Chicago (IL): 
University of Chicago Press. 
Merleau-Ponty, M., 2002. The World of Perception, translated 
by O. Davis. London: Routledge.
Mithen, S., 2001. Archaeological theory and theories of cog-
nitive evolution record, in Archaeological Theory Today, 
ed. I. Hodder. Cambridge: Polity Press, 98–121.
Reinhard, J., 1992. Sacred peaks of the Andes. National 
Geographic Magazine 181(3), 84–111.
Reinhard, J., 1996. Peru’s ice maiden. National Geographic 
Magazine 189(6), 62–81.
Renfrew, C., 2004. Towards a theory of material engagement, 
in Rethinking Materiality: the Engagement of Mind with 
the Material World, eds. E. DeMarrais, C. Gosden 
& C. Renfrew. (McDonald Institute Monographs.) 
Cambridge: McDonald Institute of Archaeological 
Research, 23–31. 
Robb, J.E., 2005. The extended artefact and the monumental 
economy, in Rethinking Materiality: the Engagement 
of Mind with the Material World, eds. E. DeMarrais, 
C. Gosden & C. Renfrew. (McDonald Institute 
Monographs.) Cambridge: McDonald Institute of 
Archaeological Research, 131–9. 
Sallnow, M.J., 1987. Pilgrims of the Andes: Regional Cults in 
Cusco. Washington (DC): Smithsonian Institution 
Press.
Sillar, B., 1996. Playing with God: cultural perception of chil-
dren, play and miniatures in the Andes. Archaeological 
Review from Cambridge 13(2), 47–63.
Sillar, B., 2000. Shaping Culture: Making Pots and Construct-
ing Households. An Ethnoarchaeological Study of Pot-
tery Production, Trade and Use in the Andes. (British 
Archaeological Reports International Series 883.) 
Oxford: BAR.
Sillar, B., 2004. Acts of God and active material culture: 
agency and commitment in the Andes, in Agency 
and Archaeology, ed. A. Gardner. London: UCL Press, 
153–209.
Sterner, J., 1989. Who is signalling whom? ceramic style, 
ethnicity and taphonomy among the Sirak Bulahay. 
Antiquity 63, 451–9. 
Stobart, H., 1996. Tara and q’iwa: worlds of sound and 
meaning, in Cosmología y Música en los Andes, ed. 
M. Baumann. Frankfurt & Madrid: Vervuert & 
Iberoamericana, 67–82.
Stobart, H., 2006. Music and the Poetics of Production in the 
Bolivian Andes SOAS Musicology Series. Aldershot: 
Ashgate.
Strauss, C., 2007. Blaming for Columbine: conceptions of 
agency in the contemporary United States. Cultural 
Anthropology 48(6), 807–32.
Tylor, E.B., 1913. Primitive Culture: Researches into the Develop-
ment of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art 
and Custom. 5th edition. London: Murray.
Weiner, A., 1992. Inalienable Possessions: the Paradox of Keeping 
While Giving. Berkeley (CA): University of California 
Press. 
Weismantel, M., 1988. Food, Gender and Poverty in the 
Ecuadorian Andes. Philadelphia (PA): University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
Wilson, A.S., T. Taylor, M.C. Ceruti et al., 2007. Stable isotope 
and DNA evidence for ritual sequences in Inca child 
sacrifice. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the USA 104, 16,456–61.
Zedeño, M.N., 2008. Bundled worlds: the role and interac-
tions of complex objects from the North American 
Plains. Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory 15, 
362–78.
Author biography (c. 50 words)

